The foolishness of Kishida LDP's pr...

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The foolishness of Kishida LDP's promise "enemy base attack power"

[Military observation deck] It is more realistic to escape underground or far away

From the official residence website

One of the promise of Prime Minister Kishida in the lower house election contained "improving deterrence, such as holding the ability to stop ballistic missiles in the opponent's region," indicating a lack of realistic thinking about military issues. I can't prohibit grief. If other countries are trying to fire ballistic missiles to Japan, destroying them will be in the right range of the right to self -defense, and it is difficult to destroy them all over the sky when ballistic missiles are launched simultaneously. is. In recent years, ballistic missiles are not always drawn by drawing a parabola, and things that change the course are also developed, so the "missile defense" that opposes ballistic missiles alone is becoming more difficult. For this reason, more conservative politicians who advocate "enemy base attacks" have increased, and Kishida is in sync with the support of such artists in the Liberal Democratic Party's election, and promises it even if he becomes the prime minister. It became. However, even if you have the "enemy base attack ability", the goal of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that fly horizontally with a jet engine are not fired from an airfield -like "base". She is on a self -propelled launcher, trailer, and trains and hides in a tunnel, and when it comes to it, she leaves the tunnel and launches a launcher. In the past, after the ballistic missile was upright, the liquid fuel was injected and fired, so it would take at least an hour to prepare for launch. Now, however, it is common to put a liquid fuel in a plastic bag to prevent metal corrosion, and put it in a fuel tank, and use a missile of "storageable liquid fuel" and an individual fuel that can be fired immediately. There is. People who talk about "enemy base attacks" often think that the position of ballistic missiles in the reconnaissance satellite, but the reconnaissance satellite is about 27,000 km / h and go north -south, about 90 minutes. One lap. Since the earth is spinning east -west, the reconnaissance satellite passes over once a day. Every day, you often go over the target point every day, so you can only shoot North Korea once a day for about 1 minute. The United States has five photo reconnaissance satellites, seven radar reconnaissance satellites and five small reconnaissance satellites, with two Japanese information collection satellites and three radar satellites. The reconnaissance satellite is useful for shooting fixed goals (such as a airfield port), but cannot always be monitored over the target area. It is often asked, "There is a still satellite. Can you monitor it?", But the still satellite goes around the equator at an altitude of about 36,000 km (about 3 times the diameter of the earth), and the earth. The speed of the satellite matches the speed of the satellite, and it looks like it is still when viewed from the ground. Although it is effective for broadcasting radio waves, the missile is not visible at this distance, and it is enough to see the large amount of infrared rays that appear at the time of firing. If an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft like a large glider with a jet engine is constantly turning over the sky in other countries, it is possible to capture the situation where missile launchers come out of the tunnel, but they are shot down with anti -aircraft missiles because they are in air. I will. Even if you turn outside the territory and shoot diagonally below, it will be difficult to find missiles because you will often wait in the hillside tunnel and fired to the bottom of the valley. If you know the location of the tunnel, it seems that you can attack it and prevent missiles, but it is easy for the opponent to build a dummy tunnel entrance, and the tunnel is medium. I don't know which one is bent, and it's not easy to destroy the bunker at the foot of the mountains by attacking from the sky. Even if the North Korean missile launcher comes out of the tunnel and captures a missile, it is unknown whether it is preparing to fire for Japan. Sometimes a missile launcher is set up for training, equipment inspection and maintenance, and it may be fired to the sea for experiments, so it is hesitant to hit the first strike. If your opponent fires one shot at a time, and if you know the position of other missiles, you can also make a retaliation attack. However, in the war, the opponent is likely to fire as many missiles as possible at the same time, so the effect of counterattack is poor. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Army launched 88 "Al Hussein" missiles, which made the Soviet "Scud B" warheads smaller and more fuel. The U.S. military, on the other hand, dispatched 64 aircraft a day to "Scud Hunt" and constantly scouted missile launch areas in southern and western Iraq, but is fired from mobile launchers and disguised simplified launchers. It was difficult to grasp the missile position before launching in the desert. As a result, a method of carrying a special unit by helicopter and hiding in several highlands and monitoring it was taken. When the helicopter flies at night to replenish the unit, I looked at the missile firing pillar and headed there, found another missile was preparing, and fired a machine gun from the door. Destroyed. This was the only example of being able to process ballistic missiles before launch. In addition, there were many reports that "I succeeded in destruction by air attack", but after the ceasefire, it was found that the simple launch platform and trucks remained after the missile was launched. 。 The Iraqi army was fired, and three days before the ceasefire, one of the US soldiers died in Darlan on the east coast of Saudi, three days before the ceasefire. For the next 30 years, the capacity of precision radar and infrared detection devices for aircraft and reconnaissance satellites and infrared detection devices has increased, and it is possible to find goals on the ground even at night and clouds, but the resolution required for identification is an optical camera. Is not. On the other hand, ballistic missiles have advanced, and the time for launching has been much shorter than "Scud", and the mobility of self -propelled fires has increased, making it difficult to find and attack. If Japan has the "enemy base attack ability", it may be due to air -to -ground missiles launched from combat and attack aircraft, cruise missiles fired from escort ships, but the opponent prepares to fire ballistic missiles. Even if you know the situation, it will be confirmed that it is directed to Japan, the government will determine the attack, and it will take at least an hour for the air unit to start. In addition, it takes about 50 minutes for the cruising speed to fly about 900 km into mountainous areas in northern North Korea to sort out from Misawa Base, Aomori Prefecture. The ballistic missile reaches Japan in 7 or 8 minutes from North Korea. It is about 200 km from the ship off the east coast of North Korea to the northern mountainous area, so the 380 km per hour, "Tomahawk", arrives within 15 minutes, but it has been confirmed that the other party is preparing to launch Japan to attack Japan. It takes a considerable amount of time for the ship to "launch a cruise missile launch", so it is unlikely to "stop ballistic missiles in the opponent's area". Before attacking North Korea, it is necessary to understand the U.S. -South Korea Allied Command, but since Korea already has sufficient attacks, Japan's participation may oppose it as a hindrance. Even if the attack on the enemy base cannot stop the ballistic missile of the other country, there is a strategy that has the ability to retaliate to the capital of the other country and other countries and suppress attacks. The United States and the Soviet Union retaliate by the "second -shot attack capacity" strategy that remains even after the opponent's nuclear attack, and avoids direct military collisions by deterring in both sides. I have come. However, North Korea has a nuclear ballistic missile, which is estimated to be about 30 or more, while Japan usually tries to fight a handgun with a handgun, even if Japan has a normal warhead missile. Similarly, there is no deterrent effect. Since the United States is very cautious about Japan's nuclear weapons, it is inevitable to collide with the United States if Japan tries to withdraw from the Nuclear Non -Different Treaty. The Liberal Democratic Party has stated in a promise of government that "keeps defense costs to 2 % or more of GDP." This year's defense budget is 5.123.5 billion yen, but this year's GDP is expected to be 559.5 trillion yen, and 2 % will be 11.18 trillion yen. According to a poll on the defense issues conducted by the Cabinet Office, the question "I disagree" and "I disagree if it would be opposite if a familiar person would like to become a SDF member." The answer was 29.4 % in 2018. In the previous 2015 survey, this was 23.0 %, so the applicants for joining were on a declining trend, especially the Maritime Self -Defense Force. For this reason, it is difficult to expand the size of the SDF even if the defense budget is doubled, and most of the budget increase is 5 trillion yen or more for "enemy base attacks" equipment and information collection equipment for that purpose. It seems to be. However, even if the number of reconnaissance satellites and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft is increased, it is extremely extremely possible to monitor the location of mobile ballistic missiles, etc., and destroy all missiles before it is fired. It is difficult and is likely to end a wasteful expense. Rather, the infrared rays of the opponent's missile launch are detected by a still satellite, and in a few minutes before it falls, as many people as possible in the basement bunker, the basement of the building, the subway station, etc. If there is a risk of getting a missile attack, it is better to move civilians from the U.S. Army, Self -Defense Force base, politics, and the center of strategy, which are likely to be an attack target, and increase the survival rate. I think it's a good measure. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki -class atomic bomb (equivalent to 20,000 tons of gunpowder), the fatal effect of the heat rays for the human body is about 3 km in radius, and the building collapses due to the blast, and there are severe people with neutrons and gamma rays. It is about 1.8 km, and it is likely that if you evacuate a few kilometers from the hypocenter, it will be saved. The "reinforced atomic bomb", which is equivalent to 100,000 tons of gunpowder, has a radius of heat rays about 2.2 times that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -class atomic bomb. The heat and blast of the atomic bomb can be avoided in the basement, and the neutron is absorbed in moist soil, so when going to the surface after the nuclear explosion, a mask is made to avoid radioactive dust and escape from the damage area. If so, the survival rate will increase considerably. Evacuation in the suburbs or escaping to the basement is a completely dull tactic, but compared to thinking about "enemy base attacks" without knowing that there is no way to know the precision position of enemy missiles. It will be realistic. ■ Toshiji Taoka (Military critic, former Asahi Shimbun editorial committee member) Born in Kyoto in 1941. In 1964, graduated from the Waseda University Faculty of Politics and joined the Asahi Shimbun. From 1968, the director of the Defense Agency, the chief researcher of the U.S. George Town Study International Affairs Research Institute, the university lecturer, the editorial committee member (in charge of defense), a visiting researcher of the Stockholm International Peace Problem Research Institute, Deputy Editor -in -Chief of AERA, Professor of Tsukuba University, etc. President. Received the Newspaper Association Award in 1982. A number of books such as "SUPERPOWERS AT SEA" (Oxford University, Publishing Bureau), "Military power surrounding Japan" (Chukyo Publishing), "How scary is North Korea and China" (Asahi Shimbun) ■

岸田自民の公約「敵基地攻撃力」の愚かさ